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On June 4, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall arrived In
Cambridge, Massachusetts, to deliver a speech at Harvard* s conmancoment ex-
ercises the following day. *lthough the Secretary was to be honored with a
Doctor of Laws degree, it was thought that his address night include "an
important pronouncement on foreign affairs." Since taking office earlier in
the year General Marshall had been involved in a ceaseless round of activity.
His most immediate problem was to prepare for the approaching meeting of the
Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled to open in Moscow on March 10. Before
his departure for the Moscow conference the new Secretary was confronted with
a crisis of the first magnitude.
On Friday, February 21, the British Ambassador asked to see General
Marshall. Although the Secretary was out of town, the State Department secured
a copy of the official note which the Ambassador delivered on the following
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MMBT« The note was to inform the United States that Great Britain could no
longer continue financial and advisory aid to Greece and Turkey, and that such
aid would be terminated on April 1. The United States response was announced
by President Truman on March 12 before a joint session of the Congress. Re-
questing §400,000,000 for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, the
President placed great emphasis upon the "broad implications involved"
t
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the
United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other
nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion....
We shell not realise our objectives, however, unless we are willing
to help free peoples to maintain their tree institutions and their
national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose
* Hew York Times. June 5, 1947, p. 23.
Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 99.
3
upon then totalitarian regimes.
Stents in Greece and Turkey provided the administration with an opportunity to
crystallize the growing sentiment for a firmer policy in dealing with the Soviet
Union* The Truman Doctrine waa regarded by the President as "the turning point
in American foreign policy," and it was later elaborated into the policy of
containment*
After approval of the aid bill for Greece and Turkey, Congress turned to
consideration of the $350,000,000 relief bill for liberated countries which
was to replace United States contributions to UNRRfi. Although the administra-
tion measure was finally autliorized, Congress had displayed reluctance in so
doing, and it was reported that House approval for the full sum came only as
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a concession to Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, The Sunday New York Tftmes on
May 18 carried a front-page story reporting Vandenberg as having indicated that
passage of the $350,000,000 appropriation would complete the foreign relief
assistance for the current session.
On April 26, Secretary Marshall returned from Moscow, Tito days later he
discussed the difficulties encountered at the conference before a nation-wide
radio audience. The inability of the Foreign Ministers to make any real progress
waa, he said, of grave consequence for the future of Europe
t
The recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected.
Disintegrating forces ore becoming evident. The patient is sinking
while the doctors deliberate,6
The $350,000,000 provided by Congress for post-UNRRA relief would do little
^ TJje Department of. state Bulletin . XVI, No. 403, March 23, 1947,
PP. 535-536.
J Truman, 0£, cjt.. 11, p. 106,
* New lork Times
.
Ifey 18, 1947, Sect. IV, p. 1.
6 The Department of State Bulletin, XVI, No. 410, May 11, 1947, p. 924.
more than keep people alive; nothing was available to rebuild the economic
machinery of the liberated countries. By Spring of 1947, 411,000,000,000 in
7
various forms had been poured into European countries by the United tatea.
This sum had provided a flow of American goods which was instrumental in pre-
venting disintegration, but expectations that Europe could progress toward re-
covery without additional aid had proved far too optimistic. It was feared
that the British loan, intended to last from three to rive years, might be
8
exhausted by the end of 1948* The severe winter that plagued Europe in 1947
gave rise to alarming reports which indicated that the economic gains made
since 1945 were in grave danger of being lost. Both the State Department and
a coordinating committee, composed of Assistant Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy Departments, were engaged in studies of this problem during March and
April.9
Administration concern with the pressing nature of European reconstruc-
tion was first publicly voiced on May 8, when Under Secretary of State Dean
Acheson appeared before an influential Southern business croup in Cleveland,
Mississippi. Speaking first of those "grim developments . . .with which we are
primarily concerned today in the conduct of foreign relations," Acheson then
turned to the problem of sustaining and increasing the flow of American ex-
ports necessary for recovery. In his discussion of this problem the Under-
Secretary advanced what was to become a key feature of the Marshall Plant
European recovery cannot be complete until the various parts
of Europe's economy are working together in a harmonious whole*
And the achievement of a coordinated European economy remains a
fundamental objective of our foreign policy.10
7 J. C. Campbell, et a^., Tfce United :tates ^n. ^sjM h££hix&, 1947-1948,
8 P# 54
"
9
Walter Millis, ed., n±e Forreatal Diaries , p. 263.
* Campbell, oj>. cit., p. 55. Willis, o£. cit.. p. 263.
10 £& department of state xlulletin. XVI. No. 411, iiay 18, 1947, p. 994.
This shift in emphasis on foreign aid from relief efforts to a program leading
to the economic reconstruction of western Europe was noted by a New York Times,
columnist on the day following ACheson's Cleveland speech
t
...those who went to Moscow have come back convinced that the de-
cisive testing ground for peace and a democratic Europe is in the
West, and that the West cannot be sustained by anything but sound
economic reconstruction.
The stage then had been carefully prepared for the "important pronounce-
ment on foreign affairs" which Secretary Marshall made at Harvard on June 5»
1947. Beginning with a survey of those conditions which had brought about
the breakdown of the European economic mechanism, the Secretary then indicated
the interest of the United States in providing assistance which might enable
a "return of normal economic health." However, such aid should "not be on a
piecemeal basis as various crises develop." Most important of alit
...there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as
to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries
themselves will take. ...The initiative, 1 think, must come from
Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid
in the drafting of a European program and of a later support of
such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The
program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all of
the European nations,12
Although Marshall»s statement was to be of great significance, newspaper
coverage of his address was limited by the space given President Truman^ fiery
denunciation of the Comnunist coup in Hungary. * However, response from abroad
was almost iMsdiate. British official opinion "warmly welcomed" the Marshall
proposal, and the British government planned "urgent steps" as a follow-up to
11 Mew fork Times . May 9, 1947, p. 3.
12 The Department of State Bulletin, XVI, No. 415, June 15, 1947,
pp. 1159-1160.
*3 Campbell, op,, cit .. p. 417.
the new American approach* a "pointed reminder" was issued, however, by a
spokesman for the British Foreign Office, who recalled thet his government's
policy was to resolutely avoid any course of action which might be inter-
preted as openly hostile to the Soviet Union. The French government also
indicated thet it was ready to assume the initiative necessary to translate
the Marshall proposal into action, and invitations went cut from Paris end
London for a conference which would attempt to formulate a comprehensive
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recovery program.
On July 12, 1947, 14 of the 22 nations which had received invitations
assembled in Paris. Any hope that the Soviet Union might work for the re-
covery of europe within the framework of the Marshall proposals had been dis-
pelled two weeks earlier. In response to a Franco-British suggestion for a
preliminary tripartite meeting, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov had arrived
in Paris on June 22, with an entourage of 39 experts and clerks. According
to the Soviet Foreign Minister, any attempt to draw up a comprehensive re-
covery program would entail intervention in the affairs of individual coun-
tries, and, therefore, such a program was not acceptable.1" Represented at
the Paris conference, in addition to the host countries, were Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Eire, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. After three days the conference ad-
journed, having set up the necessary executive and technical committees.
Although the United States was not represented at the conference, important
17
officials of the Department of State were present to give "friendly aid."
** Mew York Times. June 7, 1947* p. 6.
*jj Truman, 0£. dt.. II, p. 115.
16 Campbell, 0£. ci£., pp. 422-424.
17 Ibid., p. 432.
Even before the Paris meeting there were indications that Department of
State planners had arrived at a general understanding on the amount of money
which would be required. Appearing before the Hational Convention of the
Junior Chamber of Commerce at Long Beach, California, on June 12, 1947, Mr.
Benjamin Cohen, who was Counselor for the Department of State, declared thati
Those who have been studying Europe^ rudimentary rehabili-
tation needs tell us that Europe, including Great Britain, may
require as much as five or six billion dollars a year for another
three or four years to meet these needs.1&
Meanwhile, within administration circles there was criticism of "too much
loose talk" about the size of the sum which the United States might advance,
and a fear that Congress might feel the reconstruction project so vast as to
19
endanger our own economy.
The key figure in Congress was the Michigan Senator, Arthur H. Vandenberg,
who was the acknowledged leader in foreign affairs for the Rmrublic&n majority.
On June 13, the Lenator had issued a statement which "endorsed in principle"
the marau^H prot-osal. However, he warned against rushing "into improdent or
inadequately seasoned plans," and called fort
...a sound over-all inventory of our own resources to determine
the latitudes within which we may consider these foreign needs. ...
I think the situation invites the prompt creation of a special bi-
partisan advisory council at the highest attainable level. •• .20
Vandenberg also passed word to the President that until such a committee was
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created he would not help with the necessary legislation. Nine days later
18 T&£ Department of State Bulletin . XVI, No. 416, June 22, 1947, p. 1233.
° James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 307. Kill i s, op. cit.,
p. 262.
20 New Xork Times . June 14, 1947, p. 5.
21 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., Ttje Private Papers of Senator
Vandenberg, pp. 376-377.
President Truman announced the creation of not one, but three special com-
mittees which were to study "the relationship between any further aid which
may be extended to foreign countries and the interests of our domestic econ-
22
owy," One of these groups was the "nonpartisan cowedttoe of distinguished
oitiaens" for which Vendenberg had called. The other two groups t?ere organised
within the administration. One, under the direction of the Secretory of the
Interior, was to make a study of the country's national resources, while the
other dealt with the impact of foreign aid on the domestic economy and was to
be a project for the Council of iieonomic Advisors*
In September, 1947, the completed report of the Cosiaittee of European
Economic Cooperation was sent to the United States Secretary of State. The
total thought to be required for a four-year period was set at $22,400,000,000
after American spokesmen had advised that an earlier figure of £29,000,000,000
23
moat be revised if the entire plan was not to be placed in jeopardy. During
the next five days the President made public an interim report of the non-
partisan Committee on Foreign *id and announced that the special ooemittees
which he had created earlier would make an appraisal of the report of the
24
European Committee. On September 29, President Truman mot with important
administration and congressional Isadora to determine the future course of
25
action. The initiative which Secretary Marshall had asked of European lead-
ers htiU now been handed back to the United States.
22 J& Department of. State Bulletin . XVI, So, 417, June 29, 1947, p. 1297.
23 caapbsii, 0£» .£&•> P» 432,
* T*16 Department o£ State Bulletin. XVII, No. 431, October 5, 1947»
pp. 688-S91.""
5 Truman, go., clt .. p. 117.
The first group of technical expoerts from the Coamittee of European
Economic Cooperation arrived in the United states during the first week of
October and began consultations with govfci-n&cnt olficials ^nd members of the
26
nonpartisan Corocdttee on Foreign »iid« On October 13, the '..'hite House re-
leased the conclusions reached by the special oonndttee under the direction
of the Secretary of the Interior, and two weeks later the report of ohe Council
of Economic Advisors was made public by President Truman* These groups advised
that both our national resources and our economic system could withstand the
impact of a "considerable" foreign aid program. However, both studies indicated
that problems would be raised by such key commodities as "wheat, steel, certain
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items of industrial and agricultural machinery, coal, and fertiliser. One
week later the third of the President's special committees submitted its con-
clusions. Calling for a program costing up to $17*000,000,000 over four years,
the Cotsmittee on Foreign Aid placed the cost to the United States for the first
year at $5,750,000,000. The strategic and political nature of United States
interest in the economic recovery of Europe was frankly recognised by the com-
mittee. It was reported that Congressional reaction to the committee's pro-
posals was generally favorable, and Senator Vandenberg, in particular, praised
28
the committee's work.
Meanwhile President Truman had reluctantly acted to reconvene the Congress.
In a statement issued on October 23, the President announced "two compelling
reasons" for the special session which would open on November 17* Voicing
first nie concern over the continued rise in prices, he then announced that!
26 M. Department of State Bulletin . XVII, No. 432, October 12,
1947, p. 740.
27 Ibid .. XVII, No. 437, November 16, 1947, p. 932.
2ft
"** New Tork Times. November 9, 1947, P» !•
It is also necessary for this Government to take adequate
steps to meet the crisis in Western Europe, where certain coun-
tries have exhausted their financial resources and are unable to
purchase the food and fuel which are essential if their people
are to survive the cooing winter.... It is clear, therefore, that
Congressional action cannot be delayed until January.29
Congress was generally receptive to the administration 1 a emergency request
30
for $597*000,000 to be spent for relief in France, Italy, and Austria. Such
a program was in the nature of an extension of the bill passed in May for post-
UNRRA relief, and was to function as a stop-gap until a recovery program might
go into effect. Communist-led strikes in France and Italy were strong in-
centives for immediate consideration of this interim aid bill, and it was
placed before the President just one month after Congress had assembled for
the special session.
On December 19, 1947, President Truman placed before Congress the admini-
stration's draft of the Marshall Plan. Bearing the title of "Economic Cooper-
ation Act," the draft provided that Congress authorize appropriation of
$17,000,000,000 for the four-year program with 16,800,000,000 available for
the first fifteen-month period running from April 1, 1948, to July 1, 1949*
After requesting that consideration proceed as rapidly as possible so as to
meet the April 1 target date, the President concluded
t
I recommend this program of United States support for
European recovery to the Congress in full confidence of its
wisdom and necessity as a major step in our Nation's quest for
* just and lasting peace.31
^ The Department of State Bulletin, XVII, No. 435, November 2,
1947, p. 852.
•*v Vandenberg, 0£. cit .. p. 380.
31
The Department of State ftfli«»
r
<n
r
XVII, No. 443, December 28,
1947, p. 1243.
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SENATE HEARINGS
On January 8, 1948, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate opened hearings on the European Recovery Program under the
chairmanship of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. The draft legislation before
the committee had been submitted with background information by the Depart-
ment of State on Decomber 19» 1947. Two days prior to the scheduled opening
of the hearings the Truman administration announced its acceptance of Senator
Vandenberg' proposal for removal of the specific four year total of $17*000,-
000,000 from the draft bill. This estimated total was in Senator Vandenberg'
s
words "... only an educated guess of highly doubtful validity," and he ad-
vised the Department of State that inclusion of any specific figure in the
request for authorization of the four year recovery program would be a great
mistake. Withdrawal of the administration's request was thought to have been
precipitated by criticism alleging that a four year authorization for a speci-
fic sum would be an attempt to bind future Congresses and was therefore un-
constitutional. This move encountered favorable reception from Representative
Charles A. Eaton, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, who com-
mented that n . . .the putting of appropriations on a year-to-year basis will
2
materially shorten our hearings and lessen the controversy."
The first witness to appear before the Committee on Foreign Relations
was Secretary of State George C. Marshall. At Marshall's side throughout his
testimony was Lewis « Douglas, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain.
According to the Department of State memorandum furnished for the committee,
1 New York Times, January 6, 1948, p. 1. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr.,
ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. p. 385*
2 New York Times. January 7» 1948, p. 1.
uAmbassador Douglas would appear immediately following the Secretary of State's
testimony and would % , • deal with the essential elements of the program, the
justification of the program, and the principles governing the operation of the
program. ** Although Marshall's remarks before the committee were confined to
general principles, he left little doubt concerning the necessity for an ade-
quate program!
Our assistance, if we determine to embark on this program to
aid western Europe, must be adequate to do the job, . . . An in-
adequate program would involve a wastage of our resources with an
ineffective result. Either undertake to meet the requirements of
the problem or don't undertake it at all.4
Secretary Marshall also indicated that the £6,800,000,000 required for the
first fifteen month period was not just an "asking figure" based upon antici-
pated reductions prior to approval. Bather, said Marshall, it represented a
"realistic appraisal" of the sum required to take western Europe and this
country out of the "blind alley" of relief.
Cross-examination of the Secretary revealed the importance which members
of the Congress attached to the administration of the recovery program. The
draft legislation provided for appointment of a single administrator outside
the Department of State. This position was to be equivalent to cabinet rank,
and the man chosen to fill it should have the necessary qualifications to en-
able the Economic Cooperation Administration to function in a "businesslike"
manner. Such an administrative organisation was, however, in direct conflict
with the recommendations of the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid. This
group under the defacto chairmanship of Representative Christian a. Herter,
European uecovary Program. Hearings before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 80th Congress, 2ri Session, Part I, p. 10. Hereafter cited
as Sen. Hearings, pjgg. on For. Rel .
4 J&id., I, p. 4.
5 See Appendix a.
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Republican, of Massachusetts, had called for the creation of a government
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corporation to administer the recovery program. Senate concern with the ad-
ministrative machinery for the program was directed at the nature of the rela-
tionship between the Administrator and the Secretary of State. Although the
draft legislation had provided for an independent agency, Secretary Marshall
flatly stated that: "There cannot be two Secretaries of State." Under question-
ing by Senator Tom Connelly, the ranking Democratic member of the committee,
Marshall indicated that in matters of foreign policy the Secretary of State was
to exercise paramount influence over the Administrator of the Economic Coopera-
tion Administration. However, the Administrator might appeal an irreconcilable
dispute to the President.' Marshall felt that* "The organizational structure
we have proposed provides a means for giving appropriate direction and control
in matters of foreign policy to the Administrator of the EC* with least inter-
8
ference in the businesslike conduct of his task." Senator Vandenberg, however,
expressed the view that "the language of this bill is so compelling, it might
well result in Department of State interference in the day-to-day operations
of the Administrator. Although the Secretary of State conceded that his view
might be incorrect, he also stated that he would continue to favor the adminis-
9
trative organization found in the draft legislation.
"/Idle Secretary Marshall occupied the stand, criticism of the recovery
program draft was mild, .hen Ambassador Douglas appeared on the following day
with his team of experts, the atmosphere had changed. Launching into a more
United States Foreign Pol-icy J&L & .Rcittrf/aw Recovery Program, Hearings
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 60th Congress, 1st and 2d
Sessions, Ptrt I, p. 8. Hereafter cited as House Hearin|ge. Com , on
,
For * Affairs .
J ttfc*
Hearings * Com , on For . Rel.. I, p. 19.
J
Ibid .. I, p. 9.
9 Ibid .. I, p. 28.
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detailed presentation, Douglas encountered a persistent cross-fire of
questioning from committee morabors. Although often interrupted, the Ambas-
sador's presentation was, in general, favorably received. The coooittee
noted with approval that the draft legislation called for a total initial
expenditure which was less than the nonpartisan citizens committee had re-
ported a* a minimum figure* However, dissatisfaction continued to be
expressed over the administrative structure proposed for the program. Senator
Vandenberg pointed to the omission of ". • . one fundamental specification
which is overriding t I!
And that is you must create a system in which the American
people have confidence or you will be sunk without a trace.
... Their view is that if they are to be happy they want a
new element of business responsibility that will give them a re- ^
liance that this program is to be conducted in a businesslike way.
The committee also voiced concern over the status of the Administrator's
field representatives in each of the participating countries and the communi-
cation channels through which the iiconomic Cooperation Administration would
carry on its functions. The Ambassador's testimony was brought to a climax
late that afternoon with an unexpected interjection by Senator waiter George,
Democrat, of Georgiaj
... I do not think that the State Department is justified
in presenting absolute alternatives. ... That is a technique of
propaganda that I do not quite appreciate myself. ... the Secre-
tary of State says that we must do the whole of this or none. Now,
I do not know whether, if we reduced it slightly, we would necessarily
destroy the whole program.**
It was reported that Douglas looked on speechless with the surprised committee
members while Senator George re-emphasised his point*
10
Ibid.. I, p. 112.
11 New York Times. January 10, 1948, p. 6.
12 §&• Hearings. Com. on. For., iial.. I, p. 160.
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We're told here flatly that $6,800,000,000 is necessary for
the first fifteen months and that we must do the whole thing or
no part of it. That is not a proper statement to aake before the
legislative branch of the government.^
Earlier in the day Secretary Marshall had told reporters that rumors
predicting his resignation unless the European Kecovery Program was approved
without real change were completely unfounded. Following ambassador
Douglas's appearance the committee devoted most of one week to testimony from
other high government officials. First to appear was Secretary of Commerce
William Averell Harriman, who had served as chairman of the nonpartisan
President's Committee on Foreign Aid. Although the Senators demonstrated
interest in comparison of the Harriman committee's recommendations with the
provisions of the draft legislation, the Secretary ot Comnerce was able to
complete his testimony in one afternoon. Secretary of Agriculture, Clinton
P. Anderson, and Secretary of the Interior, Julius Krug, were heard on the
following day. Both agreed that the recovery program would not drastically
affect the American economy, and Anderson told the committee that there was
no connection between the recovery program and President Truman's request for
15Standby controls over foodstuffs in short supply. " Financial machinery for
the operation of the Marshall Plan was explained by Secretary of the Treasury
John W« Snyder and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import
Bank. Snyder discussed the procedure which would employ the experience and
facilities of the Export-Import Bank to handle the loan element in the re-
covery program. Under questioning from Chairman Vandenberg, Secretary Snyder
indicated that he subscribed to earlier testJioony which had placed 20 to 40
13 hew York Times. January 10, 1%8, p. 1.
15 laid .. January U, 1948, p. 1
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percent of the requested funds In the category of loans subject to repayment.
The committee expressed serious concern over the failure of the draft legis-
lation to utilize privately owned investments held in this country by citizens
of participating countries.
Military aspects of European reconstruction were discussed by Secretary
of the army, Kenneth C, Royall, and his superior, secretary of Defense, James
V. Forrestal. ivoyall explained that the administration of the recovery pro-
gram in western Germany was to be handled by the military government, but
that allocation of funds for that purpose would be determined by the economic
Cooperation Administration. In response to questions, Secretary Royall stated
that in the absence of the recovery program his department would feel addition-
al military appropriations to be required. When pressed to indicate the mag-
nitude of these additional requests, the Secretary gave a figure of $2,250,-
000,000 which he said represented the reduction made in combined army-«ir
16
Force Initial requests because of the recovery program. Royall also warned
that the present system of voluntary enlistment would not be adequate to se-
cure the man-power necessary for a stronger defense establishment. Later in
the afternoon Secretary of Defense Forrestal said that he thought an increase
of 25 to 50 percent over current military appropriations would be required if
17
there were to be no recov ry program.
On January 16, the committee, having concluded its examination of high
government officials, turned to the second phase of its hearings. Great in-
terest was displayed in the testimony given by the first witness, John J.
licCloy, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
16
^2fi- Hearings. Cog. on For.. Re^., I, pp. 470-471.
x? Jbj£., I, p. 485.
IteCloy described the procedure used by his organization for insuring that
loans were utilized only for the purpose granted. At the conclusion of his
testimony, Senator Vandenberg noted th&ti "If we could establish a system of
following our dollars abroad to see that we're getting our money's worth, half
the criticism of this program would disappear.
On the following Monday the first of "four or five top-level business
executives of the country," which Senator Vandenberg had suggested for the
19
role of aggressive witnesses, appeared before the committee. ' Outlining an
eleven-point program of his own, Bernard II. Baruch urged that Congress base
the recovery plan on a guaranteed market in the United States for the world's
raw materials and an all-out production effort in this country. Baruch 'a pro-
posals also involved the revival of wartime controls on food, prices, and
20
wages, and a fifty percent restoration of wartime excess profits tajces.
The witness then produced his recommendations for a new '«operating authority"
to handle administration of the program. This agency should function in a
manner similar to the Tennessee Valley Authority and would be preferable to
the creation of a new government corporation under control of a board of
directors. Mr. Baruch also stated that the administrative proposals in the
draft legislation were unsatisfactory. Referring to the Department of State
as a "think" rather than a "do" agency, he said that the administrative au-
thority should function apart from Department of State officials in its over-
21
seas operations but should maintain close liaison with our embassies abroad.
The Republican advisor to the Secretary of State was the featured witness
18 New York Times. January 17, 1948, p. 1.
** Vandenberg, pj). cit .. p. 383
•
20 New lork Time3. January 20, 1948, p. 1.
Sj»n. Hearings . Com, on For. Kgl., II, pp. 563-564.
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on the next day* Stressing that economic integration of western Ijurope
should be an explicit objective of the Marshall Plan legislation, John Foster
Dulles said that he would not attempt to justify the administration's request
for ^,800,000,000. However, he also issued a warning!
1 am confident that if in the name of economy the European
Recovery Program is abandoned, or made inadequate, that will
involve our nation in future costs far greater than any present
saving.22
As the hearings continued, solid backing for the Marshall Plan was expressed
by representatives of four leading veterans organizations. Their testimony
was overshadowed by the recommendations of fomer President Hoover.
Although unable to appear in person, Hoover submitted his views in a
letter to Senator Vandenberg. Striking out at the concept of a continuing
four year program, the former President called for a &3#000,000,000 plan ex-
tending over 15 months and placing emphasis upon consumption goods "• • •
which are essential to maintain life." MI believe, M said Hoover, "the
American people are perfectly willing to give these commodities as a gift to
23
those countries who cannot pay for them." Capital goods should be financed
through reliably secured loans from the Export-Import Bank or the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development, associates stated that Mr.
Hoover was in general agreement with the figure of vl,000,000,000 proposed in
the draft legislation for capital goods. Under Hoover's program western
European requirements for capital goods would be paid out of increased produc-
tivity. Republican supporters of the administration draft expressed grave
2
Ibld«« Us P. 591.
23 ££&•> H» PP« 707-712.
"* New York Times. January 22, 1948, p. 1.
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concern that the former President's criticism might have served as a rallying
point for the loosely organized opposition farces. President Truman quickly
released a statement flatly rejecting the Hoover proposals. He was supported
by Senator Vandenberg's assertion that a four year coranitment was an indis-
25pensable factor in the recovery plan. m Minority Leader, Alben W. Barkley, a
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, also disagreed with the
Hoover recommendations, and said he planned to subject them to cross-examina-
tion using the mails if necessary. Meanwhile, it was reported that a group
of about twenty Republican senators, including heads of several powerful com-
26
mittees were meeting to draw up a revised airopean Recovery Program. Their
strategy centered around the drafting of amendments which they hoped would be
acceptable to Senator Vandenberg. If this line of action proved unsuccessful
a fight on the floor of the Senate would be unavoidable. Reports indicated
that leadership in the revisionist camp would focus around Senator Kobert A.
Taft, Republican, of Ohio, and that major emphasis would be placed upon pro-
posals tightening«*up the provisions of the draft legislation. It was also
thought that a substantial reduction would be sought in the size of the
initial fifteen-month authorization.
Another potential trouble spot was the integration of western Germany
into the recovery program. Criticism of the Department of the Army's adminis-
tration of the United States zone was heard from John Foster Dulles. Dulles
charged that the military government, under the direction of General Lucius D.
Clay, was operating its zone along strict nationalistic lines in defiance of
25 Ibid,. January 23, 1948, p. 1.
26 Ibid .. January 18, 1948, Sect. IV, p. 1.
Vandenberg, op. cit., pp. 384-385.
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the Marshall Plan principle of cooperation and collaboration among the
27
nations of western Europe. According to Dullea, tho transfer of adminis-
trative operation of western Germany to the Department of State was impera-
tive, and should be accomplished at the earliest possible time* The
Secretary of the Army responded with a statement on the following day charging
that Dulles was "pitifully uninformed," and insisting that both the Department
of the Army and General Clay were unqualifiedly supporting the recovery pro-
28
gram*
On Friday, January 23, representatives of organized industry and labor
came before the committee to register support for the objectives of the
Marshall Plan. Present from the National Association of Manufacturers was
Curtis || Calder, chairman of the board of Electric Bond and Share Co., whose
statement emphasized the necessity for inclusion of ten additional conditions
"calculated to protect /uaeric*m interests." Number six stipulated that:
The nations receiving economic aid from the United States
should not undertake further nationalization programs or initiate
projects which have the effect of destroying or impairing private
competitive enterprise.29
indorsing the plan for the American Federation of Labor was its president,
' illiam Green. Both of these witnesses, however, indicated disagreement with
the administrative machinery proposed by the draft legislation and favored a
more independent agency which would coordinate with the Department of State
on matters of foreign policy. Similar views were expressed by former Secre-
tary of .Var, Robert P. Patterson, the Chairman for the Committee on the
Marshall Plan, and Paul G. Hoffman, Chairman, Committee for Economic
*» New York Times . January 22, 1948, p. 3.
Loc .» cjt .
** Sen. Hearings, Com. on For . Eel .. II, p. 813.
Development*
Prior to culling the next looming 1 8 first witnesa, Chairman Vardenberg
placed a report from the Brookings Institution before the coauittee. He said
he had requested late in 1 ecaaber that the project he undertaken in order to
have available "an objective study by an independent research agency of the
30
highest standard." The report called for the creation of a new agency
under a tingle Administrator of cabinet status. It should have a noncorpor-
ate form, but the Administrator would have the benefit of an advisory board
of eminent citizens which would exercise no administrative responsibilities*
In general, the decisions of the Administrator would be final in economic
matters, and he would also be charged with the necessary negotiations with
foreign governments relating to operations under the recovery program* The
Secretary of State would have the prerogative of requesting information from
the Administrator, and he might register objection against contemplated action
whenever, in his judgment, such matters "have an important bearing on the con-
duct of foreign policy* "^ Keports indicated that release of the Brookings
study had sharply undercut the administrative proposals found in the draft
32legislation* Several days later Secretary of State Marshall told a news
conference that the Brookings proposals were quite acceptable, and on the
following day President Truman said thai he saw little difference, except
for minor details, in the Brookings recommendations and those contained in
33
the draft legislation.
Meanwhile, opposition was crystallizing against Secretary Marshall's con-
tinued insistence upon the "precision estimate" of 6,800,000,000 needed for
Ibid .. II, p. 855.
31 Ibid., II, pp. 855-859.
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2 New York Times. January 25, 1948, p. 18.H Ibid .. January 30, 1948, p. 3.
the initial 15 xoonthe operation. Faced with the possibility of heavy cuts
in the authorization for this initial period, Republican supporters of the
Marshall Plan were said to be developing a formula that would reduce au-
thorised expenditures for such operations to $5,500,000,000. Advocates of
this compromise solution argued that such a reduction would not affect the
actual disbursements for the initial period. They pointed to President
Truman's statement that no more than 4,500,000,000 would be spent during
the first 15 months because of the extensive organizational work required to
get the program under way. The additional £2,300,000,000 requested had been
asked as "forward obligating authority" which was to be available for com-
mitment to advance purchasing. On January 29, former Senator Robert M. La
Follette, Jr. and Richard M. Mssell appeared before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations as representatives of the President* s Committee on
Foreign Aid. After pointing out that "... experience with these programs
has proven that disbursement actually lags behind physical shipment (of goods)
in many cases," RLssell said that if the entire "gap" of $2,300,000,000 rep-
resented only forward obligating authority for goods not yet shipped, he
34
thoutfit the amount to be excessive. If, however, the gap figure represented,
in part, goods already shipped for which there was a contractual obligation
not yet discharged by Department of Treasury disbursement, that was a dif-
ferent matter. Seizing upon one portion of Bissell's testimony, newspapers
carried stories emphasising that Harriman committee spokesmen had labeled
the i6,800,000,000 figure as excessive. Reports indicated that a minimum cut
of 11,000,000,000 appeared certain.35 President Truman responded with a
^t £2i» Hearings . Com.^on. Fo£. j^gl., II, p. 987.
35 New York Times. January 29, 1948, p. 1.
vigorous defense of the original amount requested, declaring that the full
12,300,000,000 margin was absolutely essential for maintaining the uninter-
rupted flow of goods to Lurope* Anything less would reduce the recovery
program to a relief project, 'hen asked by reporters if his position was
36
one of "all or nothing," the President replied in the affirmative* Earlier
that day the administration position had been strengthened by a letter from
John J. McCloy which was placed before the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions. Although lic&oy admitted tht-t ". • .no figure can, therefore, be put
forward with conviction as representing an exact estimate of the- amount of
financial assistance required," he thought it fair to say that "• • • the
amount recommended for appropriation by the administration is conservative."^'
Meanwhile, the opposition group of Republican senators, now meeting at
the Washington home of Senator Reed of Kansas, had announced agreement upon
38
the changes which they hoped to make in the recovery legislation* Their
spokesman, senator Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota, called for a complete shift
in the emphasis underlying the liarshall Plan "from the underwriting of trade
deficits to the support of specific production programs*" Under this approach
continued financial aid would be contingent upon increased European output of
food, coal, steel, and transportation facilities* Senator Ball said such a
program was designed ". • • to increase the chances of ljurope's becoming
self-supporting and to decrease its chances of going on a permanent dole."'"
Among the list of revisions proposed by the opposition group were the creation
of a joint-congressional "watchdog" committee and the withholding of aid from
36 Ibid .. January 30, 1%8, p. 1.
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countries where it appeared that such funds might be utilized to further the
nationalization or socialization of industry. It was reported that some of
those endorsing the proposed revisions were opposed to the recovery program
in any form, but they had agreed to support the changes at the amending stage
of the floor debate. Indicative of the attitude of some of the "revisionists"
was Senator Clyde U. Reed's reply to one question put to him by a reporter:
Would not the subordination of the Department of State to the Administrator
in the operation of the recovery program violate the constitutional preroga-
tives of the President relative to the conduct of foreign policy? "The
answer to that is, 'we don't give a damn,"1 said Senator Reed. Earlier
that same day Senator Raft, in answer to President Truman's demand for "all
or nothing," had asserted that N . • • there certainly will be some cut in the
41
amount." One week later a four member revisionist delegation, headed by
Senator Bell, placed their proposals before Senator Vandenberg behind closed
doors. According to reports, the delegation received no encouragement re-
specting those revisions designed to effect the basic approach of the draft
42
legislation. Senator Vandenberg indicated that he had no comment on his
meeting with the group.
On January 31* ttlchard 11. Blssell, Jr., who had appeared for the Harri-
man committee with former Senator La Follette, was recalled by the committee.
"when asked to clarify his previous remarks on the nature of the $2,300,000,000
gap or margin figure, Blssell said that £1,500,000,000 of this figure repre-
sented goods which would be shipped during the initial fifteen-month period
but still unpaid due to the lag in disbursements. The remaining 4600,000,000
40 Loc clt .
41 Loc. clt.W Ibid .. February 8, 1%8, p. 31.
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represented the sun available as forward obligating authority. Other raoves
at counteracting the influence of the Republican revisionist group in-
cluded a press interview by Senator Tom Connally, the ranking Democratic men-
ber of the Committee on Foreign Relations* The Senator predicted that efforts
to bring about substantial alterations in the draft bill would fail because
t
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"They don't have the votes." The administration also acted to remove one
of the complaints of the revisionists by announcing, through the National
Security Council, that foreign assets blocked under wartime freezing orders
were to be released for the benefit of the participating countries* Accord-
ing to newspaper reports, Senator Vandenberg was moving behind the scenes in
an attempt to reach agreement on a reduction of (1,000,000,000 in the adminis-
tration's request, but had been unable to oain assurance from certain other
Republican leaders that the program would be protected from heavier reduc-
45
tions on the Senate floor or in conference with House leaders*
A pointed reminder of the necessity for early congressional action on
the iXiropean recovery Program was issued by Secretary Marshall in his February
4 news conference* Marshall said that unless approval was forthcoming by
April 1, a vacuum would occur in the pipeline of goods and materials to
western Europe* ou tor Vandenberg expressed confidence that Congress would
complete action by the deadline, but Senator George said he did not share
Vandenberg's outlook* Reservations were also expressed by the chairman of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, who said th&t his group would not be
ready to report a bill until after April l*^6
** sen. Hearings
. Com. o£ For, iel.* Ill, pp. 1167-1168*
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New York Times. February 2, 1948, p. 1.
*j> Ibid .. February 4, 1948, p. 16.
lbid«« February 5, 1948, pp. 1, 12*
On February 5, four weeks of public hearings before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations were brought to a dose* The Chairman said he was hope-
ful that the legislation could be reported out of committee about February 20.
The hearings had revealed widespread support for a European Recovery Program
with substantial opposition limited to a small minority of those called to
testify. Among those sharply critical were the financial editor of M—Meuuk.
the president of the National i conoraic Council, Inc., and the American Coali-
tion of Patriotic Societies. Numerous representatives from the maritime in-
dustry expressed complete dissatisfaction with provisions in the draft legis-
lation designed to hold down shipping costs through utilization of merchant
crews and ships from the participating countries. Another witness represent-
ing the National Retail Farm Equipment Association was concerned about the
supply of power equipment for American farmers, and suggested that horse-
drawn machinery was more suitable for iuiropean conditions. However, major
farm organizations such as the National Grange and the American Farm Bureau
went on record as favoring the Marshall Plan legislation, spokesmen for the
American Labor Party and the National Farmers union opposed the European Re-
covery Program as a unilateral action and demanded that it be placed under
control of the United Nations.
Meeting in executive session on February 10, the Committee on Foreign
Relations voted unanimously to adopt the Brookings Institution recommendations
47
for the organizational machinery of the recovery plan. The necessary admini-
strative agency was to follow the model of the Atomic Energy Commission, and
the advisory board was to be advisory in fact and without directive authority.
47
Ibid .. February 11, 1948, p. 1.
Two days later the comittee, under Chairman Vandenberg' s direction, added
a separate overriding provision making the continuance of aid contingent upon
the "continuity of cooperation" among the participating countries. The com-
mittee also adopted new and more specific language spelling out conditions
and means for the termination of aid. Chairman Vandenberg maintained "with
some vigor" that the cconittee had to date approved nothing that was contrary
to the original concept of the Marshall Plan. His strategy was rather to
whittle away at criticisms of the revisionists by inserting provisions that
would tighten-up the draft bill. After five days of closed-door meetings,
the committee announced approval of a four year recovery program with
$5*300,000,000 to be made available for the first twelve months operations.
This initial authorization for a twelve month period ending April 1, 1949,
w«s an exact relative figure to the 16,800,000,000 which had been requested
49
for a 15-month period, ' Again Vandenberg had acted to mitigate the influence
of the opposition; however, he denied that he had any understanding with Chair-
50
man Styles Bridges of the Conmittee on Appropriations, Reduction of the
initial period of operation, said Vandenberg, would allow the new Congress to
review the program early in its first session. Approval of the authorisation
concluded the conmittee *s tentative approval of the draft bill, and the chair-
man announced adjournment until February 17, when a meeting would be held for
a vote on reporting the bill.
Reaction to the recovery program in its tentative form was still not en-
tirely favorable. Senator Taft said thst $5,300,000,000 was still too large,
*• Vandenberg, ££. cit .. pp. 388-389.
New York Times . February 13, 1948, pp. 1, 8,
^ Co"g « Rec .. 80th Cong., 2d Sees. p. D87.
50 New York Times. February 14, 1948, p. 1.
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and predicted a reduction. Senator Heed felt the amount to be ". • • larger
than we think it ought to be," and foresaw the introduction of an amendment
cutting the authorization to about *4,Q00,000,Q00» another revisionist,
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska, called the twelve iaonth authorisation
a move to "pick up a few votes." On the other side of the chamber Senator
Connelly said he found little opposition to the committee bill among Senate
51
; eraocrata. Before reporting the bill the comaittee took one other step
advocated by Senator 1'aft. On February 17, Senator Eugene D, Millikin, chair-
nan of the Finance Coonittee, appeared before the Coonittee on Foreign Rela-
tions with a proposal directing that $3,000,000,000 of the estimated budget
surplus for the 1943 fiscal year be set aside for financing the initial op-
erations of the Marshall Plan. Its effect would be to postpone Truman ad-
ministration plans for the retirement of a like amount of public debt, and
also to create a more favorable atmosphere for the contemplated Republican
tax cut. /tlthough admittedly a bookkeeping operation, acceptance of the
proposal was regarded as strengthening prospects for passage of the recovery
52
legislation without substantial modification. With the opening of debate
scheduled for March 1, the members of the cooaittee concluded their responsi-
bilities as draftsmen and prepared to assume the task of management on tne
Senate floor.
HOUSE HEARINGS
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs; of the House of
Representatives had opened on December 17, 1947. Hie initial witness
Ibid.. February 15, 1948, pp. 1, 29.
52 Ibid" February 18, 1948, p. 1.
Representative Christian a. Herter, vice-chairman of the House Select Com-
mittee on Foreign Aid, This group had been formed to study policy issues
which needed to be resolved prior to the drafting of a European Recovery
Program* The select committee was organized with representatives from each
of the major standing committees concerned with problems of foreign aid. jOL-
though under the nominal chairmanship of iiepresentative Charles A. «aton,
chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the group sailed for ijurope
late in august of 1947 under Representative Herter' s direction ana became
popularly known as the Herter committee. This committee returned on October
10, and early in ftovoBiber first released certain "agreed Points on i rinciples
of Foreign Aid." at this time the proposal for a corporate administrative
body first made its appearance
t
The administration of any foreign-aid program requires the
settinc up of a new authority in a corporate form over which con-
gressional control woulu be maintained by the regular review of
its funds and operation. This authority should have a bipartisan
board of directors appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.*
On Novenber 25, 1947, Herter introduced a bill embodying the administrative
proposals of the select committee. In his appearance before the Committee on
Foreign Affairs he asked that first priority be given to consideration of the
required organizational form rather than to the amount which might be needed
3
to finance a recovery program. After hearing Herter, the committee ended
public testimony until the openinf of the new session in January.
The hearings were re-opened on January 12, 1948, with Secretary of State
idiropoan Recovery Program, ^en. Doc . Ill, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 6.
2 Ibid ., pp. 133-334.
^ Ho"Q« Hearlrya. Com. on For. Affairs, I, p. 7.
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Marshall leading the parade of high government officials appearing before
the committee, .ith few exceptions their testimony paralleled that which
they had given only a few days earlier before the Senate Committee on Foreign
4
Relations. Several of the witnesses concluded their testimony before the
Senate committee just in time to hurry over to appear before the House group*
Ambassador Douglas, in the role of major spokesman for the Department of State
draft legislation, was perhaps the busiest man in the Capitol as he attempted
to adjust his schedule to conform with those of the two congressional commit-
tees. By January 27, the House committee had concluded testimony from high
administration officials, and it then begun five weeks of testimony from rep-
resentatives of interested groups outside the government. By the end of
February it had become increasingly apparent that the committee was going
through the motions necessary to complete public hearings. Criticism of the
recovery legislation by such witnesses as Lrnest T. fteir, chairman of the
National Steel Corporation, provoked little response from the committee, and
no more than five members were present at any one time on the day that \<eir
and other critics appeared. On February 26, Chairman Eaton announced hie
approval of the $5,300,000,000 figure in the Senate bill, and he predicted
that his group would report a bill out by the middle of March. One day later
Representative Herter and other members of the select committee came before
the Committee on Foreign Affairs with their recommendations, h ceiling of
,4,500,000,000 for first year European recovery expenditures headlined the
group's proposals. Such a figure was the lowest yet advocated by any official
* See Senate Hearings.
' Mew York Times. February 26, 1%6, p. 4.
source, and Herter was reported to have a large following In the House of
Representatives* Other recommendations in the Herter report Included a
provision requiring that at least one-third of all Marshall Plan aid should
consist of repayable loans channeled through the . xport-Import Bank. The
select committee continued to advocate a corporate type administrative organ-
ization.
Further complications appeared in the form of a growing disposition in
the House of Representatives to link new aid for China and further assistance
to Greece and Turkey to the House bill on European Recovery. Speaker of the
House Joseph V« Martin said his personal view was that such a procedure would
be followed. '..'hen asked whether an effort would be made to take action on
the floor of the House before April 1, Martin replied that he was unaware of
7
any obligatory date for passage of the recovery legislation. Meanwhile, on
the other side of the Capitol, Senator Vandenberg said that the Communist coup
in Czechoslovakia and mounting pressure on Finland had made prompt congres-
sional action on the European Recovery Program imperative. Although anxious
to coordinate its timetable with that of the House, Chairman Vandenberg said
its failure to advise his committee of its schedule made it necessary for the
Senate to mov< ahead on its own. March 15, two weeks after the opening of
8
floor deliberations, was set as the target date for final Senate action. On
March 1, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted a resolution proposing
immediate executive sessions directed toward the drafting of legislation for
a European Recovery Program. One week later it was reported that leaders in
6 M£»» February 28, 1948, p. 1.
7 Ibid .. February 29, 1948, pp. 1-4.
8 Loc. cit .
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the House thought final passage might cone around the middle of April. The
administration responded by sending Secretary Marshall, accompanied by Under-
Secretary Lovett and Ambassador Douglas , to ca31 on Speaker Martin with a
personal appeal for all possible speed* Martin gave no assurance aside from
a personal expression of confidence that final action on the recovery legia-
9
lation would be completed before April ID. He did, however, arrange for *
sting of House and Senate leaders in order that closer coordination on the
legislation might be achieved.
The major stumbling block in effecting such coordination was the con-
tinuing desire of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to report an omnibus
bill including areas outside the scope of the Marshall Plan. Under Senator
Vandenberg's leadership the Senate Conoittee on Foreign Relations had centered
its attention on the iiuropean Recovery Program, and was not scheduled to deal
10
with other aid proposals before npril 10. Any demand for a package foreign
aid bill would therefore have the effect of postponing final action on the
Marshall Plan until late spring or early summer* In an attempt to expedite
House consideration members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs met with
Speaker Martin and Majority Leader Charles a. Halleck. Following this con-
ference Chairman £aton said his committee would not necessarily be bound by
its earlier decision to report an omnibus bill. There were, however, indica-
tions that the Chairman might not be speaking for a majority of his committee,
and he conceded that there was "tremendous opposition" to separate recovery
legislation. On March 11, House leaders and Republican members of the
? Mew York Times . March 9, 1948, p. 1.
10 Ibid., p. 13.
n M&-» "wen 10, 1948, pp. 1, 10.
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Committee on Foreign Affairs agreed to report all foreign aid measures in a
single bill with two titles. The first section would be composed of the
European Recovery Program and the #570,000,000 requested by the administration
for economic aid to China, a second title would include the $275,000,000 re-
quest for continued military aid to Greece and Turkey plus an undetermined
and unrequested amount for military assistance to China. Such a policy wee
in line with rather consistent Republican strategy in the House aimed at a
long-range assistance program for China.12
Indications that the Truman administration felt a delay beyond the April 1
deadline to be inevitable were substantiated by a letter from President Truman
to Speaker Martin. Calling attention to the n . . . danger that a break in
the supply pipeline will occur between the end of the Interim Aid Program,
• • • and the start of any program which could be authorised under the .Euro-
pean Recovery legislation," the President asked for an additional £55,000,000
to be allocated on the same basis as the original interim aid appropriation.
Administration circles now began to concentrate on a revised deadline which
emphasized the necessity for congressional approval before the critical Italian
election of April 18. On March 15, the approved Senate version of the rAiropean
Recovery Program was sent to the House of Representatives and referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the conmittee announced morning, afternoon,
and night sessions to hasten drafting of their bill. A move by Democratic mem-
bers of the committee to report the Senate bill for immediate floor consider-
ation was defeated by the Republican majority. Three days later the committee
12
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indicated that it would stand by the $5*300,000,000 mropean Recovery Pro-
gram* However, a provision was inserted requiring that ^1,000,000,000 of the
total be advanced in the form of added loan authority to the i&port-Iaport
Bank, thereby reducing the required authorization for appropriations to
14
;i,,300,000,000. The committee draft sidestepped a decision on the adminis-
trative machinery for the program by stipulating that the administrator should
exercise his discretion in determining the necessary organisational form* This
compromise was thought to be a means of avoiding alienation of the Herter sup-
porters while leaving the way clear for restoration of the independent agency
during the conference meetings over resolution of House and Senate differences*
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs completed action on the omnibus
foreign aid bill on March 19* Following another unsuccessful Democratic at-
tempt to restrict the draft to a Liiropean Recovery Program, the minority
issued a statement protesting the hurried consideration of aid to China,
Greece, and Turkey. They said they had voted to report the package bill
16
".
. . against our better judgment," In addition to the recovery program
the committee bill carried authorizations of ,275,000,000 for continued mili-
tary assistance to Greece and Turkey, and 4570,000,000 for aid to China}
1120,000,000 of the Chinese total was earmarked for military assistance* On
March 22, the Committee on Rules met in closed session to determine arrange-
ments for the floor debate* Representative Eaton appeared before this group
to request that general debate on the legislation be limited to ten hours*
By prearrangement with the House leadership the rules group ordered a fifteen
££&&• £S&«* 30th Cong*, 2d Sum,, p. D162*
*5 Hew fork Times . March 18, 1948, p* 6*
16 Ibid *. March 20, 1948, p. 1.
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hour debate* This procedure contemplated introduction of the bill on
Tuesday, March 23, with the measure ready for amendment on the following
Monday.
SSUkTE FLOOR ACTION
Senate floor action on the European itecovery Frogram had been initiated
on Monday, March 1, by Senator Vandenberg in his capacity as chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relatione. Speaking before packed galleries, Vandenberg
began by issuing a sharp challenge to his colleagues i "The greatest nation
on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership. We oust choose." He
then moved into a frank assessment of the uncertainties inherent in the re-
covery program:
There are no blueprints to guarantee results. We are entirely
surrounded by calculated risks. I profoundly believe that the pend-
ing program la the best of these risks. I have no quarrel with those
who disagree, because we are dealing with imponderables. But I am
bound to say to those who disagree that they have not escaped to safe-
ty by rejecting or subverting this plan. They have simply fled to
other risks, and I fear far greater ones. For myself, I can only say
that I prefer ray choice of responsibilities .3-
Casting a "sidelong glance" towards Senator Taft, Vandenberg said the recovery
2
program "... strives to help stop World liar III before it starts." The
specific figure which the committee recommended for authorization **• • • was
in no sense a stab in the dark," but rather "... was sustained by the most
complete studies and surveys I have ever seen in a congressional committee.
... At the very least it is entitled to a presumption of relative depend-
ability until more competent authority competently proves otherwise." Senator
W lb£d,., March 23, 1948, p. 9.
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Vandenberg also stressed the value of the opportunity for an early assessment
of Marshall Plan operations* Then more seasoned and Informed judgments might
be made: "Next January is not too long to wait for the accounting with so much
at stake ."*
Summing up with seven key points, Vandenberg concluded his address with
these words:
There is only one voice left in the world, Mr. President,
which is competent to hearten the determination of the other na-
tions and other peoples in western iAiropo to survive in their own
choice of their own way of life. It is our voice.*
Senators and spectators alike came to their feet with thunderous applause, and
almost the entire membership of the Senate converged on Vandenberg' s desk with
offers of warm congratulation. Despite floor rules the presiding officer mad*
no attempt to restore order, and he too Joined in the applause. Id the con-
clusion of the enthusiastic reception accorded the report of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, ;;anator Kenneth 5. herry, the majority whip. Joined Sena-
tor Vandenberg in a request for prompt submission of contemplated amendments.
Senator herry then announced plans for a recess until the following day.
The resumption of Senate floor action on Tuesday began with a series of
questions addressed to Senator Vandenberg by the majority whip and several of
hiB colleagues. An effort to challenge the four year authorization as prece-
dent-breaking was rebuffed by Democratic and Republican supporters of the
legislation. In response to a question from Senator Wherry, Vandenberg said
he did not think it possible to work out a formula which would restrict the
export of scarce products such as steel and wheat. This statement met a cold
Joe. cit .
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6 New York Tinea. March 2, 1%8, p. 1.
reception, however, and Senator herry announced thatt "I think it proper to
write into this bill a prohibition against the export of such materials in
7
excess of a certain amount during this period • " A request for the inser-
tion of a provision into the bill which would require funds accumulated in
participating countries to be used for currency stabilization was not fa-
vorably received by Vandenberg, and a question from Senator James R. Kem,
Republican, of Missouri, provoked a sharp answer from the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations* Asked whether there was any reasonable
assurance that the recovery legislation would prevent the spread of Com-
munist infiltration, Senator Vandenberg replied; "Can the Senator from
Missouri give me any reasonable assurance as to what the plans of the Polit-
buro are in the Kremlin tonight regarding their conquest of the ^est? If he
8
can give me a reasonable assurance, I shall try to reciprocate it."
This line of questioning was continued by a leading spokesman for the
revisionist Republicans, Senator Joseph H. Ball of Minnesota, He began by
commenting that in the newspaper coverage of Senator Vandenberg' 8 speech
"• • • every headline that I saw was to the effect that 'Vandenberg urges
EBP in order to prevent world war III. 1 " Vandenberg responded with the as-
9
sertation that he did not write the headlines. Senator Ball then questioned
the relation of economic stability to the curtailment of Soviet expansion:
... it has seemed to me that the economic situation of the
people who one by one were pulled behind the iron curtain had very
little to do with what actually happened to them} • • • • The Com-
munist idealogies have no appeal to any people who have ever known
freedom, however hungry they may be.
7
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The oorioua thing about the (recovery) program 1* that I see
no signs that the administration has any policy or program, either
individuaily or in concert with other individual nations , or through
the United-Nations , to solve that problem of pure Soviet power ag-
gression.
After listening to Senator Vandenberg reply that he expected Senator Ball to
"•
. • argue himself into substantial agreement with my own point of view
before he is finished," the liinnesotan closed the debate for the day with a
more emphatic reiteration of his earlier statement: "• • • we have been try-
ing to stop this ruthless Soviet power-aggression with dollars and we haven't
even slowed it up." Later that evening a group of revisionist Republicans
agreed to submit an amendment designed to provide for mutual defense pacts
12
among the free nations of the world*
Debate on Wednesday began with an Informal discussion of an amendment
which Senators Ball, cherry, Hawkes of New Jersey, and Cain of Washington
planned to submit. Some difficulties were encountered because the proposal
could not be printed and formally debated until the following day. However,
Ball had handed a copy to Vandenberg, and the discussion began with an ex-
change between Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a Republican member of the Committee
on Foreign Relations, and the Senator from Minnesota, although he said he did
not desire to debate the proposal at the present time, Senator Vandenberg be-
gan to question Senator Ball, according to its sponsor, the amendment called
for the creation of a new Supreme Council outside the United Nations which
would handle the functions originally conceived for the Security Council*
Vandenberg responded with the comment that Senator Bell wee "... a little
10
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more internationalist than I ain."
"I suspect I am," said Senator Ball, "I think I probably always have
been."
"Until the senator confronted the Marshall Plan," taunted Vandenberg.
"I do not think, by any raeans, that the test of internationalism is a
Senator's willingness to spend American resources anywhere in the world," re-
plied Senator Ball.
"1 agree," said Vandenberg, "But I also think that it is interesting to
be in favor of everything that is not available to us to vote on, and not In
favor of anything that is."
Further discussion of the amendment was ended by a flat rejection from
Senator Vandenberg t "1 can't contemplate attempting to hold back the Euro-
pean Recovery Flan, which has been considered for eight months, to develop
14
a military defense program that may be just as long in development."
Action during the remainder of the day centered around an amendment offered
by Senator J. , illiam Fulbright, Democrat, of Arkansas. The Fulbright pro-
posal would place an explicit provision in the bill favoring encouragement
of political unification of Europe. If such a provision was implicit in
the bill Senator Fulbright said he was "... unable to see any good reason
why it should not be explicit.*• The amendment encountered initial op*
position from Senators Berkley and Lodge, both msecere of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, but was favorably regarded by numerous members who rose
to its defense. Senator Vandenberg then took the floor to indicate that
while he favored the objective sought by the amendment, he also feared that
J3 Cong, hoc . 80th Cong., 2d :ess., p. 2026.H New York Times. March 4, 1948, p. 1.
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the inclusion of an explicit provision Mould give rise to political over-
tones which "• . . would be a source of maximum a .burraeswent to at least a
few of the more exposed European countries." although no action was taken
on the amendment, Senator Vandenberg was seen in earnest conversation with
17
senator lulbright as the Senate recessed for the day. Just prior to the
recess a series of amendments sponsored by Senator Owen Brewster, Republican,
of Maine, and eleven of his colleagues were presented* They provided lor the
deletion of that portion of the bill which authorized charter of three hundred
American registered merchant vessels under the flags of participating coun-
tries.
Senate action on Thursday was opened with a statement by Senator H.
Alexander Smith, a Republican member of the Coamittee on Foreign Affairs*
Senator Smith came under early fire from his colleagues herry and Kern, who
directed their questioning at the failure of the draft bill to provide safe-
guards against potential benefits to the Soviet Union. Striking at a basic
assumption of the recovery program which envisioned restoration of more normal
trade relationships between eastern and western Europe, the revisionists as*
serted that nothing in the bill restricted the right of participating coun-
tries to tra ie with the Soviet dominated satellite nations, senators Smith
and Lodge carried the brunt of the defense insisting that sections of the
legislation operated as safeguards e gainst strengthening the war potential
of the Soviet Union. They cited in particular those sections forbidding the
re-export of American supplies by recipient nations and providing for ter-
mination of assistance to countries pursuing policies out of harmony with
17 New York Times. Uarch 4, 1948, p. 3.
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the objectives of the recovery plan. During the debate Senator Connolly
rose to say that he could not see a great deal of point to many of the ob-
jections put forward by the opposition group because any goods sold to the
countries of eastern liurope by participating nations would be traded for
18
something of greater value to the western nation. Observers noted that
Senator Vandenberg remained inactive throughout the afternoon, and one news-
paper's correspondent reported that he appeared unconcerned about the course
19
taken by the debate.
late that afternoon Senator George \i. Ualono, Kepublican, of Nevada,
obtained the floor to begin his critical discourse on administration foreign
policy which he called ". . . a hodge-podge of executive orders and gifts of
20
large sums of money to foreign nations.'1 When Senator Ualone resumed bis
attack on Friday he was assisted by at least a half-dozen of his fellow re-
publican revisionists who continuously rose to ask leading questions which
prolonged his speaking time. With Senator Ualone holding the floor for all
but thirty minutes of Friday's session, it seemed apparent that the opposi-
tion had begun to employ delaying tactics. At one time during the afternoon
only eight senators were in the chamber to hear Malone's remarks. It also
appeared that Chairman Vandenberg was now at odds with the Acting iiajority
Leader, Senator Wherry, as the list of senators requesting speaking tins was
21
reported to be lengthening hourly. It was now thought that a final vote
during the next week was hopeless, meanwhile, press reports indicated that
18
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uSenator Taft would make a formal floor address on the recovery plan late
in the cooing week. He was expected to support the legislation in prineijAe,
22
but to urge that the initial authorisation be cut to &,CO0,OQ0,000.
Sarly in the Monday session of the new week Jenator Fulbright moved to
withdraw his amendment calling for an explicit statement to be inserted into
the bill favoring the political unification of Western liurope. He said his
action was motivated by Senator Vandenberg 's unfavorable reception of his
proposal and that ho had been given an understanding that action on a declara-
tion of the desirability of European unity would be considered in another form
by the Committee on foreign Relations. Action was then taken on two amend-
ments offered by Senator William F. JCnowland which had been perfected after
consultation with the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. The
first authorised the Secretary of Commerce to bar export of any commodity to
nonparticipatlng countries of .Europe if the supply of that commodity was
deemed insufficient to fill the needs of those countries participating in the
Marshall Plan. The second of the amendments directed that fifty percent of
the tonnage of commodities procured within the United states for the recovery
program be transported in American bottoms ". • .to the extent such vessels
are available at market rates." Both were adopted by voice vote after Sena-
23
tor Vandenberg indicated that he had no objection to either. The first
voting test on the recovery legislation came in the form of an
sponsored by Senators Ball and Wherry, which proposed that participating
countries be directed to adjust their exchange rates so as to reflect more
accurately the actual purchasing power of their currency. Senator Vandenberg
^ Ibid., Uarch 8, 1948, p. 1.
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responded that he could not accept the proposal, and the first roll call
vote was ordered. The amendment was lost by the overwhelming margin of $3
to 19* Only one Lemocrat, senator .-.'• Lee 0*1)811101 of iexas, joined the band
of KejAibllcan revisionists* although more amendments were scheduled to come
from the revisionist camp, it was thought that their strength liad been re-
vealed by this initial move.
The following day's action saw the beginning of an attack on the re-
covery program from another direction. Senator Glen Taylor of Idaho, who
had accepted the position as henry ..allace's third party running-mate,
obtained the floor and opened his address with a charge that the Marshall
Plan was a continuation of a foreign policy whose objective was to extend
American economic domination ". . . over as much of the world as we possibly
24
can." Characterising the recovery legislation as vicious and stupid,
Senator Taylor called for all foreign assistance to be channeled through
the United Nations. He then attacked the bipartisan handling of the foreign
Assistance programs i "We have a one-party system (in foreign affairs) Just
as hitler did." Moving on, Taylor accused the press of misrepresenting and
sensationalizing difficulties with the ooviet Union, finally, after five
hours, which continued into the next day's session, the Idaho senator con-
cluded with tho presentation of his o*n bill calling for the United States
to take the initiative in the formation of a United Nations Reconstruction
and economic Development Administration for Surope.
With parliamentary assistance from Senator Kichard B. Russell, Democrat
of Georgia, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign relations moved to bring
24
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the substitute bill to an immediate vote. In this dramatic and unexpected
step the overwhelming support for the committee bill was demonstrated as the
25
Taylor substitute was rejected 74 to 3. Only Senators Claude Pepper, Demo-
crat, of Florida, and ..illiam Langer, republican, of Worth Dakota, supported
Sonator Taylor. Later in the day the Senate agreed by voice vote to accept
the amendment offered by Senator Brewster which would remove the section from
the bill providing for charter of three hundred /userlean merchant ships to
participating countries. Although Senator Vandonberg stated that he could
not approve the amendment on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, he
said he would vote for the proposal in his personal capacity as the Senator
from ilichigan. Before recessing for the day favorable action was taken on
two other amendments. The first, offered by senator Salter F. George, Demo-
crat, of Georgia, inserted an explicit statement into the bill requiring the
Administrator to utilize private channels of trade whenever possible. The
other amendment was proposed by Senator John S. Cooper, ^publican, of Ken-
tucky, and provided for a new section in the bill which would direct the
President to encourage all countries in the .-estern Hemisphere to make avail-
able all possible assistance to the participating countries. Neither of the
proposals encountered opposition from Senator Vandenberg, ana both were
26
approved by voice vote.
Cn Thursday action centered around a series of somewhat minor amendments.
An attempt to have a substitute bill submitted by Senator HomerL. Capeha.it of
Indiana referred for further study to the Committee on Foreign Relations met
an unfavorable response from its author, and it was agreed that the measure
J
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should be held over until the following day. Then Capehart's colleague
from Indiana, William K. Jenner, obtained the floor to charge that sponsors
of the bill were using pressure to obtain a final vote on tbe recovery legis-
lation by Saturday night* a sharp denial viae issued by Senator Lodge: "w>o
far as haste is concerned, it is not a case of anyone in the Senate trying
to crowd anyone else in the Senate. W« are being crowded all over the world
by the conspiratorial activities which are cooing out of iioecow, which none
27
of us control." The first test of the revisionist group's strength since
Uonday came on an amendment offered by Senator C. «ayland nrooks, republican,
of Illinois and co-sponsored by twelve of his fellow Republicans. This pro-
posal called for replacement of the special roving ambassador created by the
committee bill with an Agent General for hconomic Cooperation who would per-
form the same function. The amentfoent, according to its sponsors, was de-
signed to enphaaiae the administrative rather than the diplomatic functions
of the special representative. After announcing that he could not accept the
amendment, Senator Vandenberg then offered some changes which he said met the
objectives of the pending amendment. However, oenator Brooks stated that he
thought the changes proposed by the chairmen of the Committee on Foreign
Relations did not go far enough. The revisionist cause was openly supported
for the first time by Senator Taft who took the floor to speak in favor of
28
the Brooks proposal. Although the amendment :vms defeated by a roll-call
vote of 52 to 25, the revisionists had demonstrated increased strength.
Other amendments approved during Thursday 1 s session were of rather minor
importance and were not contested by Senator Vandenberg. An attempt to
f Ibid., p. 2524.
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separate relief i'roa reconstruction funds met another cold reception from
Senator Vandenberg and was defeated. His announcement that an amendment
channeling aid into specific projects approved by the administrator was
acceptable brought a cutting retort from one of its sponsors. "I thank the
Senator from Michigan. I am very happy," said Senator Ball, "to find some
29
change vhich the Senator does not veto." At the conclusion of the after-
noon's debate, Senator Wherry, in his capacity as Acting majority leader,
announced that a session was scheduled for Saturday unless action could be
completed by Friday night. Shortly after the adjournment Senator ..berry re-
newed his prediction that "• . .we will finish up here Saturday night with-
30
out a doubt."
Friday*s session was highlighted by the most crucial attack planned in
the revisionist camp. After a preliminary skirmish, Senator Taft took the
floor to present his only Senate address during debate on the Marshall Plan.
Speaking in support of an amendment which he offered, the Ohio senator and
candidate for the Republican Presidential nomination clearly stated his
position at the outset of his remarks:
• • • I am in favor of giving aid to the countries of
western Europe, but only for specific programs clearly neces-
sary for subsistence, or clearly helpful in increasing their
production, especially for export. I am strongly opposed to
committing ourselves in any over-all global plan to make up
some theoretical deficiency in exports and to making any
oral commitment beyond the amount authorized for the first
year.
1 am in favor of extending further aid to the countries
of western Europe beyond the demands of charity only because ~,
of the effect our aid may have in the battle against communism.
2 Ibid., p. 2535.
30
Mew York Times. March 12, 1948, p. 2.
Cong . Rec.. 30th Cong., 2d Sees., p. 2641.
In Senator Taft's mind the recovery program viae ". • • a question of foreign
policy and foreign policy only," and had no economic justification. Re-
ferring to the substance of his amendment, which called for a reduction in
the first year' 8 authorization from the committee figure of i5»300, 000,000
to 4,000,000,000, Senator Taft said he thought *'. . • we tend to overestimate
32
the importance of American dollars and the effect such dollars can have."^
Although the Senator from Ohio indicated that he felt the bill as written did
not contain a four year morel commitment, he saw no real objection to passage
of the full four year authorization at the present time. In the conclusion
of his remarks Senator Taft marshalled his arguments against the committee
figure. First:
... on general principles of economy I think there
should be some reduction. In the second place, Mr. President,
I think the European countries should be impressed with the
conviction that the United States is not too liberal.
In the third place, 1 do not like to approve a figure
which is derived, so far as I can see, simply- from this balance
of payments theory.
Furthermore, I think it is very desirable that the ad-
ministrator be made to feel that he does not have an unlimited
fund at his disposal.33
Through adoption of his amendment Mr. Taft said the Senate could make it
clear that the administration of the recovery program was to be conducted
on a strictly business basis.
Sharp debate following the Taft address featured Senator Connally
exchanging thrusts with several of the Republican revisionists. The ranking
minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations drew laughter from the
2
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galleries on several occasions as he parried with Senators nherry and Ball*
Although Senator Taft had opened his remarks on the proposed amendment shortly
after 4t00 P. H., it was not until late that Friday evening that final action
was takexu In a roll call vote the revisionists demonstrated the greatest
strength which they were able to muster during Senate consideration of the
l&iropean /Recovery Program. However, the results of the voting once again
indicated that the opposition group could not command the support necessary
to override the position taken by Chairman Vandenberg. By a vote of 56 to
31, with 24 Republicans joining 32 Democrats, the Taft proposal to reduce
34the initial authorization was rejected. An analysis of the votes cast in
favor of the reduction shows the great majority to have come from western
and middle western states, A somewhat surprising number of these votes were
east by Senators representing the predominately industrial states in the Ohio
35
River Valley Complex, ' After a long day the Senate adjourned at 11*02 P. M,
with final action scheduled for the following day.
During Saturday afternoon and ear]y evening, supporters of the recovery
legislation acted to hasten proceedings toward a final vote. ith Senator
Vandenberg in what appeared to be complete command of the situation, unwanted
amendments were quickly brought to a vote, Among those amendments rejected
was a proposal by Senator ?.'. Lee 0»Daniel, Democrat, of Texas, which would
have provided for additional old age benefit payments. Senator 0'Daniel r^\A
he thought charity should begin at home, as the session continued into late
afternoon end early evening it became apparent that many Senators were pri-
marily interested in obtaining the floor in order that they might place their
35 M*» P. 2708.
See Appendix C,
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in the Record . However, the galleries remained packed throughout the
36
day in anticipation or final action. Among those amendments accepted were
offered by Senators Aiken and Heed relating to the use of surplus
agricultural commodities and requiring twenty-five per cent of wheat products
sent abroad to be in the form of flour. The flour amendment sponsored by
Senator Heed had become a standard provision in legislation involving the
37
overseas shipment of wheat. Another amendment sponsored by Senator Taft
calling for the insertion of a new paragraph permitting the Administrator to
acquire goods from Western Hemisphere countries through credit guaranty was
approved. The McCarthy amendment calling for participating countries to com-
plete repatriation of prisoners of war met no objection from Senator Vanden-
berg, and its adoption completed the acceptance of amendments to the committee
bill. The final challenge which the revisionists could muster came on the
Capehart proposal embodying a substitute bill that called for a program of
relief funds separated from the reconstruction program which was to be financed
through Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans for investment in free enter-
38
prises. Once again the revisionists were soundly defeated when the roll was
called and by a vote of 68 to 22 the substitute measure was rejected. By
9:CO P. M. the third reading of the bill had been completed, thereby cutting
off all proposals for further amendment, but Senators continued to make state*
ments and remarks for the Record . Shortly after midnight the question was
taken on the final passage of the bill. The roll call vote indicated over-
whelming support for the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, and the legislation
36 New York Tines. March 14, 1948, p. 53
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which was basically unchanged from its committee reported form was approved
by a margin of 69 to 17* On the vote for final passage the revisionist ranks
had thinned considerably with four I emocrats joining the thirteen Republicans
39
who remained in opposition* kn analysis of the geographic distribution of
the opposition vote discloses that most of the defections from the revisionist
camp took place in the far western states thus leaving the hard core of
visionist opposition in those middle western states centering generally in
40
an area lying between the Ohio and liLssouri rivers,
HOUSE FLOOR ACTION
Floor action in the House of Representatives was opened on Tuesday,
March 23, with the report of Representative Charles A. Eaton. Republican, of
New Jersey, and chairman of the Cocmittee on Foreign Affairs. Details of the
package or omnibus bill were reviewed by Representative John M, vorys, Repub-
lican, of Ohio, who was to act as the principal floor manager for the legis-
lation. Utilising an illustrative chart. Vorys presented a breakdown of the
component elements of the package which totaled v 6,205,000,000. Title 1 of
the package embodied a v 5,300,000,000 European Recovery Program not unlike
that approved by the Senate on March 13, The remaining components of the
bill were organized into three additional titles which provided for a con-
tribution to the Internet. onal Children's Fund, military aid for Greece,
Turkey, and China, and economic assistance to China, A demonstration of
the sentiment favoring aid to China came early in the opening day's debate
7? Cook * Uoc" 80th Cong,, 2d Sees., p, 2793« See Appendix D.
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as Representative Salter H. Judd, Republican, of Minnesota, launched into an
extended discussion of the merits of those j»rtions of the bill relating to
China. His remarks drew numerous favorable comments from his colleagues who
appeared to find almost universal satisfaction in this part of the legislation.
Sharp criticism of the bill was made later in the day by Representative Vito
Marcantonio of New York, one of the two American Labor Party representative*
in Congress. Characterizing the pending legislation as a means of extending
"• • • the control of monopoly capital over the economy of other people,"
liarcantonio said that "... this program is intended to defend not American
but satellite governments that have been established by our State Department."2
These remarks drew an equally sharp retort from Representative Howard lg Smith,
Democrat, of Virginia, who told the House: "I do wish the gentleman from Hew
York would some day speak as eloquently for the American form of government as
3
he now does of communism."
Earlier in the day Representative Herter had removed a stumbling block
from the path of expeditious consideration of the legislation when he an-
nounced his support for the committee bill "in all its principal provisions*"
Even though many of us might feel that our own individual views
if carried into the law, might improve it, nevertheless, the pass-
age of the bill is of such urgency that I feel we should subordinate
our personal opinions in order that the legislation may move forward
to completion at the earliest practicable moment.^
Herter* I action lent added weight to Representative Vorys« earlier prediction
that the package bill would meet approval with virtually no change*
Wednesday's debate was highlighted by a letter from former President
\ £220 £g£»» 8Cth Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3315.
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Hoover to Speaker of the House Martin, which Vorys read on the floor* In
hie letter Hoover first reviewed the earlier suggestions In his January 18
letter to senator Vandenberg, noting with approval that "certain additional
safeguards" had been adopted. He then discussed six further recommendations
which should be included in the bill. Among these were restoration of the
"watchdog" committee and a credit guaranty provision designed to stimulate
the extension of credits to participating countries from other nations in
the Western Hemisphere. Hoover also commented favorably on the omnibus
nature of the House bill, and said he thought all United States relief oper-
ations should be placed under one administrator. He did not. however, agree
with a section in the bill that prohibited shipments from participating coun-
tries to the Soviet Union or satellite countries if such exports were in
violation of United states export controls. Describing this section as "too
strongly drawn." Hoover said that Marshall Plan countries oust restore normal
East-West trade relationships in order to become independent of relief. "A
provision against munition shipments would appear to be sufficient." &>
phatic support was given to the $5,300,000,000 figure for the European St*
covery Program authorization. At the conclusion of his letter, Hoover
wholeheartedly endorsed the recovery legislation:
I realize that many approach this gigantic experiment with
great apprehension and a realization of the sacrifices it will mean
to our people. All legislation must be the result ox' compromise.
However, if it should produce economic, political, and self-defense
unity in Western Europe, and thus a major dam against Russian ag-
gression, it would stem the tide now running so strongly against
civilisation and peace. The plan, if well devised and under a
capable administrator, stands a good chance of success. I believe
it is worth taking the chance .6
I
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Any effort to organize scattered opposition force* was reported to have
7
collapsed with announcement of Hoover's stand*
Interest was aroused earlier in the debate when Representative Alvin
O'Konski, Republican, of lsconain, called for the participation of Spain
in the Luropean Recovery Program. "No country in the world," said O'Konski,
"has shorn such hatred for coramnlaa as have the Spanish people and the
Spanish Government. If this is an anti-Communist measure, let us include
the country that is the most anti-Comtaunist of any country in Europe at the
present time." At the conclusion of his remarks O'Konski indicated that he
planned to introduce an amendment providing for the inclusion of Spain.
On Thursday attention centered around another critical address by
Representative Harcantonio. Ills charges brought an angry rebuttal from
Representative E. E. Cox, Democrat, of Georgia, whose remarks drew thunder-
ous applause from the public galleries t
Mr. Chairman, how long, I wonder, must Members of this
body sit here end hear assaulted from day to day the Govern-
ment we love, and by people who would rip from the wall that
symbol of liberty that hangs above the Speaker's rostrum, and
who would run down the flag of the stars and stripes that
proudly floats above this capitol and run up in its stead the
flag of the hammer and sickle?9
Marcantonio, his face scarlet, jumped to his feet to challenge the pro-
priety of his assailant's remarks. After a hurried conference conducted
in what one newspaper called "an anxious silence," speaker Martin took the
chair to rule that: "There is nothing in the words uttered by the gentleman
from Georgia that reflects on any particular individual Member of the House."10
I
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although Members continued to taunt Marcantonio throughout the clay's debate,
he nade no further response, ith the announcement that the House leader-
ship planned to conclude general debate on the foreign assistance bill by
adjournment of the current day's session, most of the remaining tins was
devoted to short floor addresses enabling congressmen to place their point
of view in the Record . The attitude of many of the congressmen was well
expressed by Representative T. Millet Hand, Republican, of New Jersey
t
At best—as liarshall himself has said—it is a calculated
riskj and if , at the end I can vote "aye," it will be with the
full knowledge that we are taking a risk, not an insurance
policy; a risk that is highly hazardous, incredibly costly,
and which offers doubtful suecess,U
Numerous speeches contained remarks highly critical of the Administration's
foreign ;>olicy, and several attacked the Secretary of State personally.
There was also extensive criticism of the 1%6 loan to Great Britain which
was said to have been used to "socialize" industry and to maintain British
Colonial possessions. Just before 6:00 P, M, the House closed its Thursday
session, having heard the first reading of the bill. Resumption of consid-
eration of the foreign assistance legislation was scheduled for the follow-
ing Monday, and the House was adjourned for the Good Friday week-end.
Impressions of confidence in early and favorable action on the legis-
lation were made over the week-end by important figures in the House, Chair-
man Eaton predicted that not more than 80 negative votes ould be east against
the bill, saying* "There has been a very great change in attitude toward this
bill," The ranking Democrat on the Caciaittee on Foreign Affairs, Representa-
tive Sol Bloom of New York, agreed with Eaton and also remarked that he saw
11
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little possibility of any substantial change in the legislation,
tative Vorys announced that he was sure action on amendments could be com-
pleted on Tuesday, thereby clearing the way for final passage late Tuesday
12
or on Wednesday, On Monday the House began reading the bill for
and the session was opened with the first amendment, in the form of a sub-
stitute bill, offered by Representative Ralph V.: . Ovrinn, Republican of New
York. This substitute like the unsuccessful Ball amendment in the Senate
was designed to separate relief and reconstruction functions. The Owinn
amendment was, however, more drastic than its Senate counterpart for it
proposed to leave reconstruction to private American capital which might
receive certain stimulation from our government. Its rejection on a stand-
ing vote of 103 to 60 set the pattern for disposition of three other amend-
ments not acceptable to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. These proposals,
according to Vorys, were either ". . • a matter of tweedledee or tweedledum
14
... or we are fooling with political dynamite. 1* Great concern over the
personnel that would be selected to administer the recovery program was ex-
pressed on both sides of the aisle, bounding the keynote for a great portion
of the day* s debate, Representative Cox, Democrat, of Georgia, said* "There
should be an amendment that will limit the executive personnel in charge of
the European recovery program to only those who believe in and support our
American system of society and government." ' Representative Carl K. Uundt,
a Republican member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, rose to indicate
12 New Tork Times . March 29, 1948, p. 9.
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that the committee had amended the legislation to provide for a Federal
Bureau of Investigation loyalty check on all prospective employees of the
recovery administration. Critical congressmen, however, pointed out that
no provision in the legislation required the Administrator to be bound by
the results of the loyalty investigation. Finally Representative 5am iiayburn,
Democrat, of Texas, took the floor to answer the critics:
1 still think that the President of the United otatee,
conecious of his tremendous responsibilities, vdll name a
good administrator for this law, and that a good administrator
will, out of one hundred and forty-odd-oillion people, find a
few thousand good people, honest people, patriotic people in
the United States to help him administrate it.^6
After Mr. Hayburn's admonition, attention again turned toward demands for
the restriction of exports to the Soviet Union end its satellite countries*
Many of the congressmen said they feared a recurrence of the consequences
produced by the earlier failure to regulate exports to Japan. Representative
Ifundt then announced that the Committee on Foreign Affairs in its morning
session had approved his amendment empowering the Administrator to halt
"... the shipment of war supplies to the Soviet Union and its I atellite
countries."^ Monday's session was brought to a close with the introduction
of the O'Konaki amendment seeking to add Spain to the list of participating
countries, and it was made the pending order of business for the following
day.
Tuesday's debate opened with a move by Representative Vorys to limit
debate on the pending amendment to five minutes. He said that while the
O'Konaki proposal "... may not be the happiest way to handle the matter,"
the Committee on Foreign Affairs had decided not to object to the
16 Ibid., p. 3650.
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Pointing out that the United Nations had refused membership to Spain in
compliance vdth the United Nations' recommendation to break off relations
with that country, several members voiced strong objection* Vorys said the
committee had found the manner in which the amendment was written to be • • •
rather innocuous, so we will go along." The O'Konski proposal, he continued,
did not alter the necessity for approval of Spanish participation by these
sixteen nations comprising the Committee for European xxonoraic Cooperation*
Although Vorys later conceded that approval of the proposal probably was
"bad politics in Western Kurope," the measure was adopted by a division of
18
149 to 52* The next order of business concerned an amendment offered by
Herter which provided for an increase in the number of persons outside of
civil-servico restrictions who might be appointed as administrative personnel*
There seemed to be little opposition to the Herter proposal and it was adopted
without a division* With no amendments pending, the debate began to ramble
and opponents of the legislation directed their fire at the floor managers
of the bill* Tempers flared as Representative John £• Rankin, Democrat, of
Mississippi, charged
t
We have so many wild-eyed internationalists and ex-
missionaries on this Foreign Affairs Committee that it is a
hard matter for them to understand the sentiment of those of
us who really go back to the grass roots and represent the
American people.
I say again, if you were to take a secret vote on this
measure, it would not get 50 votes in the House*W
Mr. Vorys responded by a request to end the debate on that section ostensibly
serving as the topic for debate* His motion was lost by a vote of 48 to 61*
18
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Representative Robert F. Rich, Republican, of Pennsylvania, then gained the
floor, and he too clashed with Vorys after his refusal to yield to question-
ing by another member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Declaring that
".
. . I am going to get my 5 nsinutes or bust," Rich was interrupted by Vorys,
who retorted: "The gentleman has talked every day since we have started,"20
The House then turned to the next amendment which was offered by Rep-
resentative Judd. His proposal was designed to strengthen that section of
the bill relating to employment of administrative personnel by requiring
the Administrator to certify in writing and on the basis of the F, B, I,
investigation, that he believes a prospective employee to be of "unquestioned
loyalty." This measure along with perfecting amendments was adopted without
a division. Attention then centered around an amendment proposed by Represen-
tative William U, Coiner, Democrat, of Mississippi, and a member of the Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, which would strike out a section of the bill
providing for the charter of two hundred merchant ships to the participating
countries* Pointing out that the Senate had stricken a like provision trans-
ferring 500 ships, itr. Colmer asked that the House overrule its Committee on
Foreign Affairs, MM the exception of three members of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Representatives Vorys, Judd, and Jdunrit, who spoke against
the amendment, sentiment appeared to be ovenAelralngly in favor of the Colmer
proposal. Despite Vorys* statement that 1200,000,000 could be saved by the
transfer provision, the amendment carried 165 to 32. The temper of the House
on this measure was perhaps best expressed by Representative T. liillet Hand,
Republican, of New Jersey}
20
Loc . cit .
The only argument in favor of chartering the ships
is economy. It is a fine time for the proponents of tiiis
bill to start talking about economy. Every move except
this one has been to add & few hundred millions to the
cost.2*
A second amendment designed to favor American shipping interests was intro-
duced by Representative v.illis ?'. Bradley, Republican, of California, Im-
mediately after adoption of the Colmer proposal. It stipulated that fifty
per cent of the gross tonnage of commodities procured within the United
States must be transported on such United States flagships as are available
at market rates, according to its sponsor, only one Just criticism of his
proposal could be made, "... it is that the 50-percent requirement is too
22
small." again the floor managers of the bill objected, and again they were
overridden as the amendment was approved without a division. An attempt to
prevent Marshall Plan funds from being used to purchase petroleum products
from the /rub nations of the Middle ifiaet introduced by Representative Leo
Isaacson, American Labor, of New York, was quickly beaten down.
Late Tuesday afternoon the House reached that section of the legislation
entitled "Protection of the Domestic Lconomy." An amendment was immediately
offered by Representative Colmer calling for export restrictions on commodi-
ties and technical data to those countries attempting to prevent successful
operation of the Luropean Recovery Program. Spokesmen for the Committee on
Foreign Affairs opposed the Colmer proposal and threw their support behind
a substitute measure sponsored by Representative Mundt which had been accepted
by the committee in an earlier executive session. "Ytould it not be a lot
better," asked Vorys, "to adopt an amendment which has been considered by the
21** Cons . Reg., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3745»
22 M'i P- 3748.
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full committee and its counsel rather than one which no one has had a chance
93
to read?" Supporters of the Mundt substitute said the Colmer proposal would
result in & Mandatory embargo on a great number of commodities and was there-
fore too broad. The substitute called for restrictions on only those goods
which might contribute to Soviet war potential. The floor managers also said
the Mundt proposal closed another door left open by the Colmer amendment.
They pointed to the provision in the substitute authorising the Administrator
to halt exports of materials which a participating country processed or fabri-
cated for shipment to a nonparticipating country, after brief debate the
Mundt substitute was adopted. In a series of minor amendments just prior to
adjournment the House reversed the term "surplus agricultural commodities"
to include canned foods and domestic fishery products, also approved was an
moment protecting domestic processors of corn products; however, whiskey
barred from such benefits*
V.ith the opening of the final day's debate on V.ednesday the House con-
tinued to sit as a legislative committee for consideration of the foreign-
assistance legislation. almost immediately Representative Charles ... Vursell,
Republican, of Illinois, introduced an amendment to reduce the total authori-
sation for the i,uropean Recovery Program by $1,300,000,000. Contending that
the bill as written was not a calculated risk, "... but is the greatest
financial gamble ever taken by any government in the world," Ur* Vursell
called for a reduction in authorization, a limitation of the program to one
24
year, and the best possible management* He was seconded by Representative
John £. Rankin, Democrat, of Mississippi, who told the Republican leadership:
23 M-» P- 3759.
* Ibid., p. 3810.
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"Tour party has reversed its position, and is now going down the road to
25
international ruin for the American people." k motion to limit debate on
the amendment was withdrawn in response to former Speaker Rayburn's request.
rtfter quietly listening to critics hammer away at the bill, Hayburn roue to
address the House
i
Mr* Chairman, I never desire to and I always seek not to
give offense, but I have heard some very familiar talk here today.
I heard it in 1938, in 1939, in 1940, and even in 1941.
I am casting a vote today that I believe is in the defense
of the United States of America and in defense of our civilization.
Strip it of such things as the defense of our country and humanity.
Get down to the economy of the thing—dollars and cents. It is as
important to the cotton farmers of the Fourth Congressional Dis-
trict of the State of Texas that Western Europe be rehabilitated
as it is for .estera Lurope itself.2"
After almost three hours of debate the amendment offered by Vursell
defeated by a division of 112 to 68. Opponents of the legislation then
attempted to rally their scattered forces behind an amendnent sponsored by
Representative Lawrence 11. Smith, Republican, of Wisconsin. This proposal
called for the inclusion of a provision stating that no moral or legal obli-
gation which would require the extension of the recovery program beyond the
initial year was incurred by the Congress. «mong those speaking in favor of
the Smith amendment was the powerful chairman of the Committee on Appropria-
tions, Representative John Taber, Republican, of New York, who said, "This
amendment will make the bill what it is supposed to be. It says that this is
a 1-year bill, and it will make it a 1-year bill."^ after short debate the
proposal was lost by the narrow margin of 117 to 127.
J
Ibid ., p. 3811.
26
Ibid., pp. 3817-3818.
27
Ibid. , p. 3829.
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a aeries of minor perfecting amendments adopted was a provision
designed to identify and to put into active use the earnings of assets held
in the United States by nationals of the participating countries. The most
surprising action of the day came on an amendment offered by Representative
Lawrence H. Smith, Republican, of . isconsin, which modified the language of
the bill concerning the termination of dismantling German industrial plants
for reparation purposes. The committee draft had authorized the Administrator
to recommend that the Secretary of State seek arrangements for termination if
such dismantling was harmful to the recovery program. The Smith amendment
proposed to strike out the words "to seek," thereby authorizing the Administra-
tor to direct the Secretary of State to conclude the necessary agreements. On
a standing division the House first voted 69 to 53 for adoption, a request
for tellers from the Democratic side brought a vote of 88 to 55 in favor of
28
the proposal. Other amendments accepted included one directing the ad-
ministrator to pay certain freight and handling charges in order to facilitate
the relief operations of private groups within the United States. This meas-
ure also made aid to participating countries conditional upon free entry for
private relief packages and supplies. An attempt by friends of the Select
Committee on Foreign Aid to restore the Senate provision for a joint "watch-
dog" committee encountered the determined opposition of Chairman Eaton. In
one of his few floor utterances, Laton insisted that his committee was entirely
capable of carrying on the necessary investigations. He received powerful
support from Representative John ?/. McCormack, the minority whip, and Chairman
Taber of the Committee on appropriations. The amendment was shouted down
28
Hew York Times . April 1, 1948, 0. 3.
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29
without a division. Shortly before the dinner hour Representative Hike
Mansfield, Democrat, of Montana, led a move to eliminate title 111 of the
bill, which provided for military assistance to Greece, Turkey, and China.
The question revealed only eighteen supporters for the Mansfield amendment
as congressmen began to anticipate the final vote. This action was followed
by an attempt to strike from the bill title IV, which contained the provi-
sions for economic aid to China. It too was overwhelmingly defeated, the
division indicating: ayes 31, nos U3« Just before the bill was read for the
third and final time, a request for a separate vote on the O'Konski
to include Spain was heard. Ey a standing vote of 183 to 104 the House di-
vided along party lines, defeating the Democratic attempt to throw out the
30
previously accepted O'Konski proposal. The House then moved to the final
vote on passage of the bill. One hundred fifty-eight Democrats Joined with
31
171 Republicans to approve the legislation by a margin of 329 to 74. Sixty-
one of the negative votes registered came from the Republican side of the
House. An analysis of the geographic distribution of the opposition reveals
a concentration in those middle western states with a marked industrial char-
32
acter. Thirty-six of the 61 Republican negative votes were centered in the
five states of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, and Missouri. Of 19 Repub-
licans in the Illinois delegation, 14 either cast negative votes or were
paired against the bill. In Michigan, Indiana, and Missouri, all with pre-
dominantly Republican congressional delegations, at least 50 per cent of the
2* ]X£. cjt
.
30 New York Times. April 1, 1948, p. 1.
31 Cong. Rec., 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 3874. New York Times, April 1,
1948, p. 1.
** See Appendix £•
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majority party members voted against the bill. Fifteen additional negative
votes were cast by Republican representatives from seven middle western farm
states. Substantial opposition was demonstrated in five of these states where
roughly one half of the Republican delegation indicated opposition. In the
Iowa and Kansas delegations a large majority of votes was cast in favor of the
foreign assistance legislation, .ith final floor action in the House com-
pleted, the omnibus bill moved into conference with the Senate for adjustment
of differences.
CONFERENCE COMMITTEK AND FINAL APPROVAL
On the day following passage of the omnibus House foreign assistance
legislation, the House and senate conferees met to iron out differences.
Selected from the House of Representatives were t^aton, Vorys, Hundt, Hloom,
and Keefe. The Senate named Vanrienberg, Capper, iley, Connelly, and George.
In anticipation of the package or omnibus character of the House legislation,
the Senate had approved two other foreign aid measures after completing action
on the separate liiropean Recovery Program. On March 23, a ^275,000,000 au-
thorization for continued military assistance to Greece and Turkey had been
passed by voice vote. In spite of serious misgivings the Senate, on March 30,
had approved by voice vote the bill sponsored by the Committee on Foreign
Relations providing „463,000,000 for China with only one clearly distinguish-
able "no" vote veing oast. Funds provided in the senate bill included
ftL00,000,000 to be used for "vtoatever purpose is decided upon by the Chinese
Government
j
n the remainder of the authorization was for economic aid. The
conference committee planned to incorporate the four bills into a single bill.
New York Times. March 27, 1948, p. 1.
S. 2202, on which the conference report would be filed, irking continuously
from IOiOO A, M. the conferees completed their work shortly before midnight
on the seme day. Their most spectacular move was to throw out the House
amendment providing for inclusion of Spain in the recovery plan. The
committee had agreed, said Senator Vandenberg, "... that the 16 liuropean
participating countries are the ones who control the right of membership in
their cooperative adventure, and that it is not for us to undertake to dictate
2
the membership." The disagreement over the necessity ibr a joint "watchdog"
committee was resolved in nominal favor of the Senate position. However, the
most powerful critic of such a committee, Chairman Eaton told the House that
"• • • we in conference decided to have a little imitation one to satisfy the
brethern who had a hungering in that direction. So 1 am going along with
1
them to that extent.""^ * similar compromise was to be seen in a provision
authorising the Administrator to employ a corporate form in his organization,
if he so desired. The 3570,000,000 House figure for a fifteen-iaonth aid to
China program was discarded in favor of the twelve-month Senate program call-
ing for ;;Ao3,000,000. The Senate breakdown of these aid funds was, however,
slightly modified to allow an additional 725,000,000 to be spent for military
purposes. Of perhaps greatest significance was the retention of the House
requirement that both authorization and appropriation must be annual. Senator
Vandenberg had sought a four-year authorization with annual appropriations.
In its final form the European Recovery Program remained substantially
unchanged from the bill reported by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
The initial appropriation required had been cut by §1,000,000,000 to $4,300,-
000,000 through conference committee acceptance of a House provision direction
? ££S&» £££•» 30th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4034.
* Ibid., p. 4064.
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that 11,000,000 be segregated for loans and credit guaranties which would
be financed by Treasury notes. The total figure for components of the package
bill was set at 46,098,000,000. Pending congressional action on necessary
appropriations measures, "The Foreign Assistance net of 1948" made available
..1,000,000,000 from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to initiate the
European Recovery Program. Additional amounts of 550,000,000 each for Greece,
Turkey, and China were to be drawn i'roa the same source for similar purposes.
On the fallowing day, Friday, April 3> the Foreign assistance net of 1948 met
prompt congressional approval, >ith less than fifteen minutes consideration,
during which it heard statements from Representatives Eaton, Vary8, and Munrit,
the House of Representatives voted 318 to 75 for approval. Senate action
followed almost immediately with the bill being approved by voice vote.
On Saturday, April 3, important congressional leaders met at the hite
House to witness Presidential approval of their handiwork. In less than ten
months since Secretary of State Marshall's Harvard speech, a foralis for iSuro-
pean recovery and reconstruction had been translated into a concrete program.
The prompt consideration given the Marshall Plan legislation was even z»re
remarkable in light of the hostility that existed between the Truman adminis-
tration and the Republican-controlled 80th Congress. The prompt and success-
ful translation of the Marshall suggestion into a workable program was, in the
final analysis, a tribute to the vision and skill of those Republicans who
managed committee and floor action on the necessary legislation. No "*¥<!?
portion of this tribute must be placed at the feet of one man—the widely
esteemed and extraordinarily capable senior senator from Michigan, Arthur H.
Vsndenberg. Calling the legislation "... perhaps the greatest venture in
4
New York Times. April 3, 1948, p. 4.
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constructive statesmanship that any nation has undertaken," President Truman
completed the remaining step necessary for final approval of the recovery
program* In a remarkably expressive statement, the President paid respect to
the action of the 80th Congress on the Marshall Plant
Its passage is a striking manifestation of the fact that a
bipartisan foreign policy can lead to effective action. It is
even more striking in its proof that swift and vigorous action
for peace is not incompatible with the full operation of our
democratic process of discussion and debate. Those who are
skeptical of the effectiveness of a democratic system should
ponder the lesson of the enactment of this measure .5
SUMMARY
Public hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs both indicated that open pressure
group opposition to the Uarshall Plan legislation was slight and. with the
exception of the maritime Industry, was relatively scattered. The center of
organised opposition in the Congress was a group of western and middle-western
Republican senators initially numbering about twenty. Realizing that they
could not gut the entire program, this group hoped to bring pressure for
substantial revisions or modifications in the aministration's draft bill.
The revisionists were generally either outmaneuvered by Senator Vandenberg
or confronted with the hard fact of his calm refusal to accept their modifi-
cations. The Truman administration, fully cognizant of Vandenberg' s key role,
demonstrated a desire to reinforce his position by agreeing to his suggestions
for changes in the bill prepared by the Department of State. The crucial test
on the floor of the Senate came on the amendment introduced by Senator Taft to
cut the authorization for the initial year's operation from £5*308,000,000 to
5 H& Department of State dulletin. XVIII, Wo. 458, April 11, 1%8, p. 468,
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$4,000,000,000. Its failure to coiamanu the necessary support foreshadowed
the overshelming approval given the conraittee bill by the Senate on March 14,
New complications were introduced in the House of Representatives by the
insistence of the Cocmittee on Foreign Affairs on reporting an omnibus bill
containing aid to Greece, Turkey, and China as well as the iaropean Recovery
Program. Vandenberg insisted that such an approach would delay final action
on the recovery program until late spring or early summer because his oenate
Committee had not yet acted upon the measures for Greece, Turkey, and China.
The refusal of House leaders to modify their position again demonstrated
Vandenberg 1 3 flexibility} before the House, on April 1, approved the omnibus
bill Vandenberg had secured favorable Senate action on aid to Greece, Turkey,
and China. Under Vandenberg* s direction the conference committee completed
resolution of House and Senate differences in one day, and on the following
day, April 3> 1948, the conference report was accepted in both houses of
Congress. In its final form the European Recovery Program remained sub-
stantially unchanged from the bill reported out of Chairman Vandenberg'
•
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
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APPisNDlX B
Revisionist Senators Listed by the New York Tin—
as Present at the January 30, 1948 Meeting
Name State Represented
X*Joseph H. Ball Minnesota
X*Kenneth 5. Viherry Nebraska
X*Henry C. Dworshak Idaho
X*Jaaes P. Ken Missouri
X«William S, Jenner Indiana
X*George « Malone Nevada
Clyde M. Reed Kansas
*Arthur V, V.atkins Utah
v;:C. uyiv-ir brooks Illinois
*Zale3 N# Eoton Montana
X**E« H» Moore Oklahoma
Guy Gordon Oregon
William F. Knowland California
*C*ren Brewster Maine
X*Homer Capehart Indiana
Joseph R. McCarthy Wisconsin
X*Chapman Reverconb West Virginia
Harry P. Cain Washington
* Supported TaXt Amendment,
X Voted against the European Recovery Program on the Senate Floor*
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On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, speaking at
Harvard, announced a far-reaching re-orientation of United States policy
toward the economic problems of .estern Europe. Faced with a Republican
congress at home and the results of a severe winter on the European conti-
nent, the Truman administration had begun during March and *pril to develop
a policy emphasising the need for a new long-term economic program. Such a
program would be directed at putting Western Europe back on its feet and should
be predicated upon a coordinated and cooperative effort by the countries in-
volved. The granting of relief aid on a piecemeal basis was to be replaced
by a well-planned long-term reconstruction effort. However, Secretary Marshall
emphasized that the initiative must come from the nations of Europe. One month
later sixteen nations assembled in Paris and drew up a comprehensive recovery
program.
After careful consideration, President Truman reluctantly decided in
mid-October to reconvene the Congress. The special session opened on November 17,
with the President calling for adequate steps to meet the crisis in Y/estern
Europe. One month later, December 19, 1947, the administration's bill for the
Marshall Plan was placed before the Congress. The purpose of this thesis is to
trace the action taken by the Republican 80th Congress as it worked through
these legislative processes necessary to transform the Marshall approach into
a concrete program. Particular significance is attached to the role played
in the shaping and management of the legislation by key majority-party leaders
in both houses of Congress. It is also anticipated that the nature of the re-
lationship between the Truman administration and an essentially hostile Re-
publican Congress will be revealed.
The procedure followed has been to submit action on the Marshall Plan
legislation in each of the important stages of the legislative process to
close examination. Emphasis at each stage has been placed upon changes and
attempted changes in the draft legislation prepared by the Department of State.
At each stage of the legislative process an effort to isolate and identify the
opposition has been made with the aid of appendices showing vote distribution.
Major reliance has, of course, been placed upon the Congressional Record and
the printed record of the public hearings held before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the House Conmittee on Foreign Affairs. Certain printed
reports of the House Select Committee on Foreign Aid have also been of great
benefit, and the New York Times has proved invaluable.
The most inescapable conclusion to come from this examination of Congress
and the Marshall Plan is that despite all possible difficulties the recovery
legislation as finally approved remained substantially unchanged from the draft
bill reported to the Senate floor by Chairman Vandenberg's Committee on Foreign
Relations. It also seems apparent that the skill employed by Senator Vanden-
berg in neutralizing points of substantial opposition was of great significance
in achieving the adoption of an effective program. In the final analysis, the
successful translation of the Marshall concept into a concrete reality was a
tribute to the capacity of the American political system to function effectively
under conditions of great stress*
